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Quenching the Dragon’s Thirst 
The South-North Water Transfer Project—Old Plumbing for New China? 
By Carla Freeman 
 
As the legend goes, when a man named Yu heeded the dragon’s instructions about how to channel flood waters, he 
tamed China’s rivers and was made emperor. China’s rulers have long understood the critical importance of water in 
ensuring their country’s prosperity—and the link between how effectively they manage these resources and their own 
political longevity. The pressures for efficient management of water today is similarly challenging as in the past—
China’s government must possess the ability to maintain the hydraulic systems necessary to mitigate flooding from 
China’s great rivers but also to ensure an adequate supply of water for the needs of its people. As Joseph Needham in 
his epic history Science and Civilization in China observed, the challenges of flood control and of maintaining irrigation 
and water transportation networks, among other dimensions of water management, served as sources of innovation in 
Chinese civilization as it developed, stimulating technological invention and intellectual debate.1 
 
AN UNQUENCHABLE THIRST  
Today, China is confronting acute scarcity in its national water supply. Geographically, China’s water resources are 
unevenly distributed, with northern China’s water availability per person only a fraction of that in the rainy south. 
China’s huge population of more than 1.3 billion, a third of which is concentrated in the relatively dry Huang-Huai-Hai 
river basins of north China, is a major factor in China’s low per capita water availability. Low water productivity—or  
 
  
 
the amount of water required per unit of yield—particularly 
in agriculture, but also in China’s booming industrial and 
energy sectors, has also played a key role in exacerbating the 
country’s water scarcity. Climate change is disrupting 
weather patterns and accelerating the evaporation of glaciers, 
further diminishing surface water supplies. In addition, 
increasingly widespread pollution from industrial and 
domestic wastewater discharges of China’s surface water 
resources and 90 percent of China’s rivers near urban areas 
has not only taken a toll on human health,1 but also has 
contributed to shortages that have led to a rising 
dependence on groundwater. A consequence has been that 
critical rivers, lakes and wetlands are drying up. Water table 
levels also are falling, causing land subsidence in some 
areas.2  
 
Water scarcity is already doing measurable harm to China’s 
economic productivity, with reduced river flows affecting 
hydropower generation and limiting expansion of water-
dependent industries—from coal mining and petroleum 
refining to steel production to higher-tech industries, such as 
semi-conductors—all are increasingly constrained by the 
lack of water. Notably, most of China’s coal resources are in 
the arid north and some of China’s largest coal reserves 
remain untapped due in great part to water shortages.  
 
Finding ways to augment China’s water supply is therefore 
an increasingly pressing concern of China’s policy leaders. 
China’s Premier Wen Jiabao has called China’s water 
shortfall a threat to the very “survival of the Chinese 
nation.”3 Historically, water shortages in China have been 
redressed principally by engineering physical transfers of 
water to augment supply. Dating back to the Han Dynasty, 
chain pumps were used to move water from lower to higher 
elevations to irrigate fields or to provide water to urban 
dwellers. Mao Zedong continued this tradition using 20th 
century technology. For example, to ensure that farmers in 
arid northern China had access to ample irrigation water to 
boost grain production and other food staples, Mao 
encouraged the digging of tube wells, powered by gas or 
electric-powered pumps, to draw on water in aquifers. Such 
aggressive irrigation of agricultural land in northern China 
has continued, so that today around two-thirds of 
agricultural production in the region is at least partially 
irrigated, much of it by groundwater. The dangerously 
unsustainable nature of these pumping practices has become 
apparent as groundwater levels in the region have 
plummeted at a rate that suggests aquifers could be emptied 
by mid-century and many of north China’s rivers now run 
dry during part of the year.4  
 
REPLUMBING CHINA 
As the sense of crisis has intensified, China’s technocrats 
have pursued more ambitious efforts to expand supply. The 
past two and half decades have been an era of long-distance 
water transfer projects—all to dry northern cities. These 
have included projects involving transfers from the Biluhe 
River to Dalian, the Huanhe to Qingdao, the Lanhe to 
Tianjin, and the Luanhe to Tangshan, among others.5 Much 
of the one trillion Yuan allocated for public investment in 
the water sector in China’s 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) 
was for diverting water supplies to cities experiencing water 
shortfalls.6  
 
The most ambitious and best known of the diversion 
projects that has been launched was inspired by Mao 
Zedong, who included among his favorite allegories the 
story of the old man who set out to move the mountain 
standing between his home and the lake where the old man 
and his family drew water. According to the tale, the old 
man believed that although he would not live to see the feat 
completed, the efforts he began during his own lifetime to 
move the mountain would ultimately be achieved by 
succeeding generations. In 1952 Mao observed, “The South 
has plenty of water and the North lacks it, so if possible why 
not borrow some?” This idea gave rise to the extraordinary 
  
 
vision of building the infrastructure that would enable the 
diversion of billions of cubic meters of water from flood-
prone southern rivers to China’s dry northern region. 
  
Mao did not live to see ground broken on what is now 
known as the South-North Water Transfer Project (nanshui 
beidiao gongcheng). While he was at China’s helm, economic 
and political disruptions associated with the mass campaigns 
and radical social and economic experiments he fostered 
marginalized work on this and other massive engineering 
projects, including the Three Gorges Dam. In fact, no 
project planning office was established for the massive water 
transfer project in the Ministry of Water Resources (then 
Ministry of Water Conservancy) until December 1979.7 By 
the 1990s, with the backing of some of China’s most senior 
leaders, the project was slated for implementation. A key 
supporter was former Premier Li Peng, a hydraulic engineer 
by training who has also been linked to the decision to 
proceed with the Three Gorges Dam. Other rising leaders of 
the time, such as current Chinese President Hu Jintao, a 
graduate of Tsinghua’s Department of Water Conservancy 
program, shared similar engineering backgrounds. With such 
leadership support, 50 years after Mao articulated his 
vision—amid the additional stimulus to economic growth 
that had followed China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization—the State Council approved the project. 
Despite its initial projected total cost of $62 billion, two 
times the cost of the massive Three Gorges Dam, and 
projections that completing the project would take nearly 
half a century, a special limited liability company was 
established to execute the project and in late December 
2002, construction on the project began.8  
 
AND THEN THERE WERE THREE  
When completed, the South-North Water Transfer Project 
will be a truly colossal waterworks, linking up China’s four 
main rivers—the Yangzi, Yellow, Huaihe and Haihe rivers—
and diverting water along three canals, the so-called Eastern, 
Central, and Western routes. The Eastern route will take 
water from the lower reaches of the Yangzi River, utilizing 
as its principal conduit the 1,800 kilometer-long ancient 
Hangzhou-to-Beijing canal (which dates from the 7th 
Century A.D) to convey a supply of water to Jiangsu, Anhui, 
Shandong and Hebei provinces, as well as the city of Tianjin. 
The volume of water it is expected to deliver should be 
adequate to meet the water needs of agricultural and 
industrial sectors in all of these areas. In addition, the extra 
water flow through the canal will make it navigable 
throughout the year.  
 
The Central route will carry water from the Danjiangkou 
reservoir on the Han River (a Yangzi River tributary) to 
areas of Hubei, Henan, and Hebei, including more than a 
dozen cities, among them Beijing and Tianjin. The route has 
been designed so that water will flow from its source to its 
end point by gravity alone. A major engineering challenge 
has been the need to increase the storage capacity and 
therefore the height of the Danjiangkou Dam from its 
original 157m to 170m. In a striking display of Chinese 
engineering muscle, the Eastern and Central routes both will 
run under the Yellow River.9 
 
The Western route is stunningly ambitious. It is designed to 
tap three tributaries of the Yangzi—the Tongtian, Yalong 
and Dadu rivers—on the Qinghai-Tibet plateau, where 
nearly one-third of China’s water resources are concentrated, 
and move water nearly 500km through the Bayankala 
Mountain range involving elevations of 10,000 to more than 
16,000 feet above sea level to northwest China where it will 
help replenish the Yellow River principally to provide water 
to irrigate millions of hectares in western China but also to 
meet the demands of urban, industrial, and energy  
development in the region.10  
 
Significant sections of the overall project have already been 
completed. Current projections are that the Eastern route 
  
 
will be fully completed in 2013. Work has also pushed ahead 
on key projects in the Central canal, starting by raising the 
height of the Danjiangkou Dam. Work on this section 
started in 2005 and is completed at its northernmost point, 
where a 307km channel has been designed to carry water 
from Hebei’s reservoirs into Beijing. A six-month period of 
flow was started in September 2008 from reservoirs in Hebei 
through the channel to Tuancheng Lake in Beijing’s Summer 
Palace.11 Emergency water for the 2008 Olympics was also 
transferred to Beijing via a completed section of the Central 
canal project.  
 
The completion of this canal will be a welcome relief for 
Beijing, which faces a massive water emergency. In late 2010 
CNN reported that 62 percent of the Beijing’s 51 reservoirs 
had run dry and the city’s annual water shortage will reach 
200 to 300 billion cubic meters, 12  which underscores the 
magnitude of thirst for the completed Central canal. Beijing 
is expected to receive one billion cubic meters of water 
annually from the diversion. Other significant projects that 
are moving the Central canal forward are underway: a multi-
purpose dam on the Han River, construction of the trunk 
channel in Henan, and construction of a waterway 
connecting Nansi and Dongping lakes, the two largest 
freshwater lakes in Shandong Province.13  
 
The Western section of the project remains at the planning 
stage. Technical analyses for it have been conducted; 
however, a start date for it has not yet been announced and 
it is not slated for completion until 2050.14  
 
A FLOOD OF CONTROVERSY 
As work has moved forward on the South-North Water 
Transfer Project, the controversy surrounding it has grown 
louder. Western news reports in December 2008, quoting 
officials from China’s State Council, indicated that 
completion of the project’s Central route would be slowed 
in response to the need to mitigate its negative 
environmental impacts. The reports suggested that concerns 
raised by local environmental officials about the effects on 
river water quality of planned reductions of the water level 
of the Han River, given unusual attention by the Chinese 
media, underlay the delay. Revisions to the original project 
have been reported that will require an additional four years 
(from 2010 to 2014) to implement. These involve a scheme 
to divert water from the Yangzi to the Han to compensate 
for the reduced flows expected to result from the 
diversion.15  
 
Prominent scientists and environmentalists in and outside 
government also have raised questions about the 
environmental impacts of the three canals since the transfer 
project’s inception, with an increasing number willing to 
express their concerns publicly in recent years, in both the 
western and Chinese media. A major concern from the 
outset has been the potential to transmit disease, particularly 
snail-borne schistosomiasis, from southern China to the 
north. Numerous water treatment plants are part of the 
project’s design, but many scientists and other 
environmental experts remain dubious that they will be 
effective in containing this and other waterborne health risks 
between regions. The project’s impact on wetlands also has 
raised environmental red flags as reduced river flows will 
slow the deposit of sediments that are critical to wetland 
formation.  
 
The construction process of the canals also poses potentially 
seriously harmful ecological consequences, including salt-
water intrusion and habitat destruction. The May 2008 
earthquake in Sichuan, where some sections of the western 
diversion project are located, heightened concerns about the 
impact of seismic activity on the project and the ecological 
repercussions in the event of significant disruptions.16 These 
are only a few of a long list of concerns about the project’s 
ecological and other adverse impacts. 
 
  
 
Some of the criticism of the project from officials at the 
provincial level reflects unhappiness with the redistributive 
nature of the project, with local resources captured for the 
benefit of relatively better-developed regions. Prominent 
environmental advocate, Ma Jun, of the Institute of Public 
and Environmental Affairs and author of China’s Water Crisis 
(2003), has repeatedly argued that given the project’s huge 
financial and environmental costs, its benefits accrue 
predominantly to residents of Beijing.17  
 
 
Source: The New York Times 
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2007/09/27/world/28china
_map.html 
 
THE MOUNTAINS ARE HIGH AND THE WATER IS FAR 
AWAY (BUT NOT FOR LONG)  
Demands for Compensation 
Officials in Hebei’s capital, Shijiazhuang, who have sought 
to slow the project, have long seen Beijing’s water 
requirements given precedence over its own.18 Hebei’s water 
conservation department has reported that endemic water 
shortages have become a drag on the province’s growth. 
According to interviews with provincial water officials, water 
resources in the province have declined by 50 percent in 
recent years; the implication is that a large portion of this 
decline is due to water diversion. 19  Farmers in several 
counties in Hebei have been required to switch from 
growing rice to corn to conserve water for one of Beijing’s 
two main reservoirs. 20  Some central Chinese leaders have 
joined with provincial and municipal authorities to urge the 
central government to compensate localities whose water 
has been diverted to northern areas; some cities located 
along the diversion route have been forced to shut down 
enterprises to make way for the diversion scheme, or 
because they were polluting water designated for drinking 
downstream. Some localities have faced reduced tax 
revenues and higher unemployment. 21  
 
Provinces Balk at the Costs 
Notably, Hubei’s Shennongjia district, home of the 
Shennongjia Nature Reserve in the upper reaches of the 
Yangzi River, have asked for financial subsidies to make up 
for losses to potential local GDP. Local officials have argued 
for compensation because they must provide ecological 
services for the Central transfer canal. Specifically, because 
development in their district must meet strict environmental 
standards to ensure that the Danjiangkou Reservoir’s water 
level is sufficient to supply the South-North Water Transfer 
project, development in their region, including the ability to 
exploit the region’s valuable mineral resources, has been 
constrained.22 Problems that have accompanied the project’s 
construction have caused additional economic losses to 
other local communities and some technical problems, some 
of which have required an “emergency response,” including 
a special armed police hydropower force, to resolve them.23 
All the while, some central officials have complained that 
local leaders are not taking adequate steps to mitigate 
industrial discharges that are polluting water that is needed 
for the diversion.24 Strikingly, some northern provinces and 
cities have balked at accepting the water if they must pay to 
clean it up.  
 
  
 
Resettlement Challenges 
Still more visceral and poignant local level challenges to the 
project revolve around citizen resettlement. Some of the at 
least 300,000 people expected to be displaced by the 
project—180,000 from Hubei and the remaining 150,000 
from Henan—have begun to be relocated. At the time of 
the author’s visit to the Danjiangkou Dam in March 2009, 
where construction of a massive cap designed to raise the 
height of the original dam was proceeding apace, she was 
struck by the large sign at the gate to the dam’s fenced 
construction site that made clear that acts of protests or 
vandalism were prohibited, a reminder that just a month 
earlier farmers in the local village had verbally attacked 
village officials and threatened resistance over plans to 
resettle them elsewhere in central China. 25  Some current 
residents of the area formerly lived on the site where the 
Danjiangkou reservoir was constructed; for them this is a 
second displacement.26 
 
GO WEST…THEN NORTH 
The Western section of the project, which remains in the 
planning stage, has elicited the greatest controversy. Chinese 
scientists with China’s National Academy of Engineering, 
including Qian Zhengying, a former Minister of Water 
Resources, issued a report in 2006 urging the government to 
suspend the project for further study. This report followed 
the publication in 2005 of papers and an edited volume in 
Sichuan Province (through which an extent of the Western 
diversion passes) that were sharply critical of the project’s 
western route. Retired researchers from the Sichuan 
Provincial Academy of Social Sciences, Lu Jiaguo and Lin 
Ling, who promoted the book, had sought to draw the 
attention of the officials and the media to the question of 
whether the Western route of the South-North project 
would “save the Yellow River at the Yangzi River’s 
expense?” 27  A letter by Lu to Premier Wen Jiabao 
questioning the Western route’s viability and pointing to 
some of its likely negative impacts could have helped 
prompt a meeting between the Ministry of Water Resources 
and the Sichuan provincial government, which yielded a 
decision to delay the project. 
 
China’s Western canal plans have also alarmed some of its 
regional neighbors. China’s diversion plan would draw water 
from the Yalong Tsangpo River at the so-called “Great 
Bend” or Shuomatan Point just before the river enters India 
as the Brahmaputra. Reduced water flows would impact 
millions in both India and Bangladesh. Indian leaders are 
concerned about the leverage the project could give China 
over India as Chinese water infrastructure projects exert 
greater control over the river’s flow.28 If construction on the 
Western water transfer canal proceeds, it will be built as the 
pace of glacial melt on the Tibetan Plateau is accelerating. It 
and other hydroelectric projects underway or planned in the 
plateau will impact the great rivers that flow from the 
Chinese side, including the Mekong, Salween, Irrawaddy, 
Brahmaputra, Sutlej, and Indus. India’s Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh reportedly raised the issue of international 
rivers originating on the Tibetan Plateau during his visit to 
Beijing in early 2008, but it was not until December 2010 
that Premier Wen Jiabao announced during his visit to India 
that China would take into account downstream interests 
when damming in the Brahmaputra basin. 29  While the 
countries have renewed their MOU on sharing information 
on flooding in the basin, they have not held formal talks on 
the issue of water transfers out of it.30 In the absence of 
international agreements on trans-boundary management of 
these rivers among the riparian states, water can be expected 
to emerge as an important international security issue for the 
region.  
 
REENGINEERING DEMAND: CAN LESS MEAN MORE? 
Some of the criticism surrounding the South-North Water 
Transfer Project has come from those who advocate more 
demand-side approaches to managing China’s water 
resources. Recently, demand management appears to be 
  
 
gaining traction even among China’s most senior 
policymakers as a less risky and more sustainable solution to 
the country’s water woes. New efforts to curb demand for 
water have taken several forms, with the principal emphasis 
on conservation, introducing more market mechanisms into 
the water sector, and adopting administrative reforms that 
seek to better integrate water resources governance at the 
central level, yet strengthen local capacity over some aspects 
of water supply management. 
   
CONSERVATION POLICIES 
China’s leaders set ambitious targets for water conservation 
as part of the vision, as stated in its 11th Five-Year Plan 
(FYP), to become a “resource conserving society.”31  The 
11th FYP (2006-2010) and associated 11th FYP for Water 
Resources Development set goals of managing water as a 
strategic resource. Objectives of the 11th FYP for the 
agricultural sector were to keep total water consumption for 
agricultural irrigation constant. The mandated target for 
industry in the plan was to reduce water consumption per 
unit of industrial added value by 30 percent. 32  China’s 
central government has reported that it invested nearly 300 
billion Yuan ($45 billion) on water conservation during the 
five years of the plan, with the total investment in water 
projects related to conservation in China from other levels 
of government bringing the total to approximately 700 
billion Yuan. 33  Minister of Water Resources Chen Lei 
announced in late 2010 that China would double its average 
annual investment in construction related to water 
conservation over the coming decade. 34  New goals to 
manage water consumption and improve the efficiency of 
water usage announced for the 12th FYP period include 
limiting annual consumption of water in China to below 620 
billion cubic meters and achieving an even more substantial 
reduction in industrial water usage than under the 11th 
FYP.35 
 
The Chinese government has launched pilot projects to test 
the potential of various approaches to water conservation in 
a range of sectors. These include pilots in rural areas in 
which the Ministry of Water Resources is collaborating with 
the Ministry of Finance to provide subsidies to farmers to 
improve the efficiency of their irrigation systems. 36  This 
pilot program builds on efforts to improve water saving in 
rural areas through the introduction of technical solutions by 
a number of policy measures, including the 2005 Water 
Saving Technology Policy issued by the NDRC with several 
ministries (e.g., water resources, housing, agriculture and 
science and technology). These policies have accelerated the 
renovation of existing irrigation systems and in changing 
watering practices and techniques such as wet/dry irrigation 
for rice production.37   
 
WATER PRICING AND TRADING 
Unlike many past pilots aimed at promoting more 
conservative use of water, over the past few years the 
Chinese government has been pushing for technical and 
technology-based efficiency gains to be accompanied by 
reforms on water rights and pricing. Such reforms could 
help reconcile the large discrepancy between the value of 
water and its current cost to users. Specifically, these 
reforms have been aimed at changing the way water is 
allocated, through the development of a system of water 
rights to facilitate water trading and ultimately water 
pricing—the latter has been a particularly hard sell in rural 
areas. The cost of water for agricultural use is extremely low, 
even free. Farmers who use groundwater, for example, 
frequently pay only the cost of the energy used to extract the 
water and water use is rarely metered. The Chinese 
government has pushed to shift the operation of water 
distribution and fee collection from village committee to 
Water User Associations and to encourage irrigation district 
agencies to operate on the more efficient and potentially 
transparent basis of commercial principles, whereby Water 
  
 
User Association fees would be a key source of operating 
income, for example.38 
 
Water trading also has been introduced through a number of 
pilot projects, including those based on “water certificates” 
granted to individual households, which permit farmers to 
purchase “water tickets” up to the level permitted by their 
certificate that can then be freely traded. 39  Despite these 
projects, the expansion of water markets to promote more 
efficient use of water in agricultural production is 
proceeding slowly. China’s leaders are wary of 
compromising hard-won gains in rural incomes or 
jeopardizing the country’s food security by depressing food 
production—particularly in the face of public discontent 
over rising food costs.40  
 
Water tariff reform is well underway in China’s cities, which 
have seen significant increases in water prices in recent 
decades. Across most cities, however, water prices still do 
not generally reflect costs for water distribution, sewerage 
and water management, with the result that water for 
China’s city-dwellers costs a fraction of what residents of 
European cities pay, and about half of what it costs Brazilian 
consumers.41 This is changing rapidly as China’s municipal 
leaders recognize that, despite public opposition to increases 
in water tariffs, the reform of water prices to better reflect 
water scarcity offers a critical tool in promoting water 
conservation that could be a vital part of sustaining 
economic growth. In addition, as increasing numbers of 
sewage treatment plants are constructed, water tariffs must 
include the cost of sewage treatment.42  
 
To mitigate citizen complaints and concerns about the 
regressive effects of price increases on those with lower 
incomes, the NDRC has promised subsidies to groups most 
affected by increases in water prices and has with the 
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development issued a 
circular requiring that local governments insure that low-
income families have a basic standard of living when raising 
water prices, 43  which reflects deep-seated concern by 
government authorities about the potential for mass protests 
over hikes in the cost of water.44  
 
CONSERVE—BUT ALSO CONSTRUCT? 
Despite these efforts aimed at promoting conservation, 
Chinese leaders recognize that changing established patterns 
of water use is its own gargantuan project. The push for 
more efficiency in water use over the last several years has 
yielded only modest progress to date. After several years of 
disappointing data, a report to the National People’s 
Congress in March 2010 indicated a reduction of 8.2 percent 
in the amount of water used per 10,000 Yuan of value added 
industry, finally exceeding expectations. 45  However, 
agricultural water usage continues to account for around 70 
percent of total water use and productivity remains at about 
half the level of that of developed countries at 1.0 kg/m3, 
with as many as half of the country’s existing water 
conservation facilities related to agriculture still needing 
repair. 46  At the same time, government efforts to reduce 
consumption by raising the cost of water remains extremely 
unpopular, particularly amid rising food and energy prices. 
An online survey at www.people.com.cn, reported in the 
Chinese media, indicated that more than 60 percent of 
Chinese citizens are opposed to seeing increases in their 
water bills.47  
 
Chinese officials recognize the potential for reducing 
pressures on water supplies by better protecting water 
resources through a range of measures, including tightening 
regulations to prevent water pollution and trying to improve 
planning for water allocation and the management of water 
quality through more integrated, river basin-wide approaches 
as well.48 In addition, China is pursuing the construction of 
large-scale seawater desalination facilities. As water prices 
rise and as the price to desalinate seawater falls with the 
introduction of technological advances, desalinated seawater 
  
 
is expected to become a major source of water for cities like 
Tianjin and Beijing. 49  None of these initiatives, however, 
sounds the death knell for continued progress on the South-
North water transfer project’s construction. Chinese leaders 
have remained committed to the project, including its 
controversial western section, with the Office of the South-
to-North Water Diversion Project Commission of the State 
Council announcing in May 2010 that work on the project’s 
East and Central sections had been accelerated. 50  Recent 
reports indicate that China has now earmarked 90.6 billion 
Yuan for the project, a significant increase from the 53.87 
billion Yuan announced in 2009. 51  
 
While Chinese experts now acknowledge that the Tibetan 
glaciers that feed China’s major rivers are not the 
inexhaustible source of water they once were and are 
melting at a “worrisome” speed,52 the sense remains that, as 
former PLA Party Secretary, General Zhao Nanqi is said to 
have remarked a decade ago when evaluating the project, 
“Even if we do not begin this water diversion project, the 
next generation will. Sooner or later it will be done.”53 
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